OPERATIONAL ART OF WAR 2 CRASH SERIES

A standoff quickly developed between the Ukrainian and Russian naval bases at Sevastopol.

OPERATIONAL ART OF WAR 2 CRASH SERIES

Military action commenced on 2 March with a series of incidents involving the surrender and capture of Ukrainian marines at Feodosiya and the attempted hijacking of the Ukrainian navy ship Slavutych. According to statements made by Putin later on, there were approximately 22,000 Russian personnel in Crimea at the Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol prior to March 2014. The Russian Federation Council, upper house of parliament, at the behest of Russian President Vladimir Putin authorized the use of the Russian military to ensure the security of ethnic Russians living in the Crimean region. Info-graphic displaying the initial movements. The initially covert actions acted as the prelude to the breakout of Russian forces from the Sevastopol naval base. Whatever the origin of the plan, the seizures and preparations prior to 1 March suggest the calculated and complex nature of the Crimean operation. Meeting in an emergency session, the Crimean parliament voted no-confidence to the Prime Minister, appointing as a replacement, Sergey Aksyonov of the Crimea Russia Unity Party, who promptly moved for a referendum on secession from Ukraine with a preliminary date set for. The gunmen arrived in three KAMAZ military vehicles without plates or markings. Another 50 gunmen in fatigues but without markings and described as wearing вЂњthe same gear as those who seized the buildings of the Crimean parliamentвЂќ laid siege to Simferopol airport. The next day, 28 February, Russian forces described by RueterвЂ™s newswire as вЂњRussian servicemen wearing helmets and armoured body protection and backed by armoured personnel carriersвЂќ blockaded Belbek airport at Sevastopol. On 27 February sixty pro-Russian gunmen, 30 of whom arrived by bus and were described as heavily armed, seized the Crimean parliament buildings. On 26 February military personnel wielding Russian flags established checkpoints along the highway between Simferopol and Sevastopol.

Д¬overt military deployments began at the end of February. Events leading towards military intervention began to unfold on 25 February 2014 in the Crimean capital of Simferopol where hundreds of pro-Russian protesters were involved in demonstrations against the new Ukrainian government. Had this occurred, the Black Sea Fleet would have been relocated at the naval base of Novorossiysk. Talk of Ukrainian inclusion in NATO as early as 2008 had challenged RussiaвЂ™s control of the Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol, prompting then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to describe Ukraine as an вЂњartificial country.вЂќ Russian control of the Black Sea Fleet base, however, had not been scheduled to expire until at least 2017. How was this stunning military success achieved at the operational and tactical levels? What does the Crimean conquest reveal about current Russian operational doctrine?ДЇollowing the turmoil of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution Western analysts expected some form of blowback from the Russian Federation. The lightning military conquest of Crimea triggered a major Russia-NATO showdown that is still evolving. By the end of the month Russia had completed the annexation of the entire Crimean peninsula and was under pressure from the international order. Дuring March 2014 Russian military forces captured key Ukrainian army, navy and air force bases around Crimea. Russian flags fly from a watchtower at the Ukrainian Naval headquarters at Sevastopol. Russian Operational Art of War in Crimea, March 2014

Operational art of war 2 crash